

WHAT'S WRONG WITH STEREOTYPING?

Book Proposal

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1a. Introduction

On February 4th 1999, four police officers searched a Bronx neighborhood for a rape suspect, a black male in his twenties. Around midnight, they saw a man fitting the profile standing at the doorway of an apartment building. They ordered him not to move. The man reached into his pocket and pulled out his wallet. Believing that he was holding a gun, the police officers shot and killed him. They fired forty-one shots. The man, twenty-three year old Amadou Diallo, was innocent and unarmed.

Events such as this—tragic, troubling—illustrate an ordinary human tendency: a tendency to rely on stereotypes. In the United States, black men are often stereotyped as dangerous and aggressive. Women are stereotyped as empathetic and caring. The list could go on. Experiments show that people tend to interpret ambiguous information to fit stereotypes, especially in conditions of uncertainty. Research participants are faster, for example, to interpret an object in a black man's hands as a gun. They also tend to shoot armed black men in video games faster than armed white men and mistakenly shoot unarmed blacks more than whites.

These facts are disturbing. Stereotyping can cause epistemic mistakes: false beliefs and unreliable judgments. Stereotyping is also associated with serious moral and political evils, including prejudice, discrimination, and oppression. Yet, according to psychologists, stereotypes play an invaluable cognitive and practical role in human lives. Indeed we could not be fully rational but for our capacity to form and use stereotypes.

What's Wrong with Stereotyping? investigates the ethical puzzles associated with stereotyping from a philosophical perspective. How, I ask, should we conceptualize stereotypes and stereotyping? Should we think that stereotyping is always wrong despite its cognitive and practical benefits? Should we think, instead, that stereotyping could never be wrong because of its cognitive and practical indispensability? If stereotyping is sometimes but not always wrong, how do we tell the bad cases from the rest?

1b. A New Topic in Applied Philosophy

What's Wrong with Stereotyping? offers a new—and significant—contribution to applied ethics for the following reason: its subject matter is unique. No other book of analytic philosophy pursues a theory of when and why stereotyping in general is ethically wrong.

The book nonetheless takes up a familiar kind of project in applied ethics, namely, “an

explanatory project” (Stroud forthcoming). Any activity that is typically presumed to be wrong—for example, terrorism, lying, prostitution, murder, brainwashing, or slavery—can be the subject of an explanatory project. A theorist proceeds by testing the initial presumption of wrongness. Is the phenomenon indeed always wrong, as people presume? Is it only sometimes wrong? What explains why it is wrong, when it indeed is? If a theorist successfully answers these questions, she ends up with a theory of wrongness for the phenomenon in question.

Given its subject matter, the book is an ideal fit for Oxford University Press’s *New Topics in Applied Philosophy* series. The series aims to showcase “work (monographs and reference books) on topics in applied philosophy that are not covered well by the existing body of literature and are sometimes not widely conceived as a topic of applied philosophy, i.e. new or emerging fields of investigation.” My book fulfills other objectives associated with the series as well. For example, its arguments are empirically informed. My research also exemplifies a commitment to interdisciplinarity, and I aim to make the book accessible to specialists and non-specialists alike.

1c. Relationship to Existing Literature

Relationship to literature in psychology on stereotyping. Suppose you wanted to understand what stereotypes are and what stereotyping is. To investigate the matter, you might consult books on the psychology of stereotyping. Paging through bestsellers like Daniel Kahneman’s *Thinking Fast and Slow* (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2010) or Mahzarin Banaji and Anthony Greenwald’s *Blindspot: The Hidden Biases of Good People* (Delacorte Press 2013), you would only get more confused. That confusion would deepen if you cracked open an academic sourcebook like David Schneider’s *The Psychology of Stereotyping* (Guilford Press 2005). Stereotypes are alleged to be numerous things by different authors: associations, beliefs, concepts, schemas, prototypes, heuristics. Stereotyping is also characterized in a variety of ways.

My book aims to reduce the confusion generated by this plethora of views. While I introduce readers to research on the psychology of stereotyping, I also provide a general framework to understand diverging views.

Among psychologists, stereotyping is understood as a cognitive process. To stereotype is to judge persons by group membership, and stereotypes are defined as informational structures necessary for forming and using concepts, e.g., schemas. This way of conceptualizing stereotypes and stereotyping is non-moralized: it does not build moral wrongness into the very idea of stereotypes and stereotyping. Moreover, stereotyping is characterized as a process that could be epistemically problematic or unproblematic.

At least some readers will be sympathetic to a quite different conception of stereotyping. Old-school conceptions of stereotyping build epistemic defect into the very definition of stereotypes and stereotyping. You might think, for example, that to stereotype is to judge others by false or misleading beliefs about social groups that resist evidence (Blum 2004). Often epistemic-defect conceptions of stereotyping are also moralized, meaning they stipulate that stereotyping is necessarily problematic from an ethical point of view, as well as epistemically problematic.

In legal discourse, one finds a yet different conception of stereotyping: to stereotype, the thought goes, is to wrongly judge persons by group membership. This conception is moralized. However, it does not stipulate that stereotyping is epistemically irrational or must involve false or unwarranted beliefs about groups. Giving up this stipulation has two benefits. First, it releases us

from the restrictive assumption that stereotypes are beliefs, leaving open the possibility that stereotyping could involve other kinds of mental states, including associations, aliefs, or in-between beliefs. Second, it brings to light a new possibility: stereotyping could be morally wrong, even if there is nothing epistemically defective with a person's stereotypes and her application of them to an individual is epistemically rational.

As I chart the conceptual domain associated with stereotyping, readers get a better sense of how contemporary psychologists' understanding of stereotyping relates to competing conceptions of the phenomenon.

My book serves as a complement to research in psychology in a second way as well. Psychologists often have things to say about what's wrong with stereotyping. For example, in *Thinking Fast and Slow*, Daniel Kahneman writes that, "resistance to stereotyping is a laudable moral position, but the simplistic idea that resistance is costless is wrong" (169). Psychologists are not in the business of defending normative claims, however. Kahneman, for instance, never explains why we should think that resistance to stereotyping as such is morally laudable. My book delves into claims such as his and gets to the bottom of them.

Relationship to theories of wrongful discrimination. As I explore the ethics of stereotyping, I deploy a well-established literature in legal philosophy. Legal theorists and philosophers with a legal bent have long asked, "what's wrong with discrimination?"

When answering this question, writers tend to defend unified theories. Unified theories identify at least one wrong-making feature common to all cases of wrongful discrimination. Some claim that wrongful discrimination is always harmful (Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, *Born Free and Equal*, OUP, 2014); others that it is always demeaning (Deborah Hellman, *When is Stereotyping Wrong?* Harvard University Press, 2008); others that it is always motivated by prejudice (Richard Arneson, "What is Wrongful Discrimination?" 2006); yet others that it always frustrates people's ability to lead flourishing lives (Tarunabh Khaitan, *A Theory of Discrimination Law*, 2015).

Suggestions such as these could apply directly to stereotyping. It might even be that stereotyping is a form of discrimination: *cognitive discrimination*. If so, we wouldn't need an independent theory of wrongful stereotyping. We could just use the best theory of wrongful discrimination to explain when and why stereotyping is wrong.

My book argues that there is—perhaps despite first appearances— a great deal to be gained from connecting theories of wrongful discrimination to theories of wrongful stereotyping. Here is one example. Theorists of discrimination recognize *statistical discrimination* as a standard kind of wrongful discrimination. Yet statistical discrimination is not motivated by prejudice. Thus many writers argue that prejudice cannot always explain what's wrong with discrimination. The exact same point, I argue, applies to stereotyping. But the claim is more surprising as it relates to stereotyping, perhaps because it is often assumed that wrongful stereotyping and morally bad prejudice are inextricably linked.

My book doesn't just exploit the literature on wrongful discrimination, however; it also contributes to it. I make novel objections to unified theories of stereotyping, and these apply equally to analogous theories of wrongful discrimination. Moreover, my positive view reimagines what a disjunctive, i.e., non-unified theory of wrongful discrimination could look like, providing a richer, more plausible model than is currently available.

Relationship to philosophical literature on implicit bias and stereotyping. To motivate this new theory, I consider commonplace objections to stereotyping.

Nowhere have these objections been better articulated than in the growing philosophical literature on implicit bias and stereotyping. In the edited volume *Women and Philosophy: What Needs to Change?* (OUP 2013), Jenny Saul and Fiona Jenkins observe—independently of one another—that implicitly biased judgments caused by stereotyping can violate norms of fairness. In *Epistemic Injustice: The Power and Ethics of Knowing* (OUP 2009), Miranda Fricker argues that testimonial injustice—a paradigm case of ethically wrongful stereotyping—is wrong because it is caused by morally objectionable prejudice. In *Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes* (Harvard University Press 2006), Frederick Schauer observes that stereotyping can exacerbate pernicious social inequalities.

These objections are insightful and important. But none of the theorists just cited claim to be defending a theory of when and why stereotyping *in general* is wrong. The ethical puzzles associated with stereotyping thus remain. Is stereotyping always wrong for the above reasons? Or is it only sometimes wrong? If only sometimes wrong, why? Is wrongful stereotyping always caused by prejudice? Does it always marginalize? Might it always harm? Is it always unfair? Is a unified theory of wrongful stereotyping even possible?

My book is the first to explore these questions. Even cutting edge volumes such as Michael Brownstein and Jennifer Sauls' *Implicit Bias in Philosophy: Volumes I and II* (OUP, 2016) leave such questions unasked and unanswered. In contrast, I develop ethical objections within the existing literature on bias and stereotyping—such as the ones cited above—and test the extent to which they could serve as the basis for an adequate theory of wrongful stereotyping. I also evaluate the only theory of wrongful stereotyping explicitly defended in the literature. That theory—due to Lawrence Blum—is articulated in a single article (Blum 2004). Blum says that stereotyping is always wrong if and only if it involves failing to treat persons as individuals.

I argue that no unified theory of wrongful stereotyping is possible. Wrongful stereotyping is a diverse category that lacks unification. My own theory of wrongful stereotyping emerges as I reflect on Thomas Scanlon's contractualist ethical theory (*What We Owe to Each Other*, Harvard University Press, 1998). According to Scanlon, wrongful actions or judgments are unjustifiable to others; however, unjustifiable actions and judgments count as such for a range of reasons. The best theory of wrongful stereotyping, if we adopt this picture, would consist in an account of the grounds on which someone could reasonably reject being stereotyped. Such a theory, I suggest, could incorporate many of the objections mentioned in this book. The result is a pluralistic, non-reductive theory of when and why stereotyping is wrong that faithfully reflects the complexity of objections to stereotyping.

Relationship to epistemology. Savvy readers will notice an apparent omission in the book: there is no chapter on the epistemology of stereotyping.

This is not a mistake. I have intentionally structured its chapters around commonsense ethical objections. Some of these objections have an epistemic element—for example, the objection that stereotyping is motivated by ethically bad prejudice. When relevant, I spend time unpacking the epistemic dimension of an objection and explain its relationship to ethical norms. However, not all ethical objections to stereotyping depend on epistemic criticisms—for example, the objection that stereotyping is harmful. This objection—and others—could apply even if there were

nothing epistemically wrong with stereotyping.

One upshot—which finds support throughout the book—is that we should not think of wrongful stereotyping in the old-school way, i.e., as always epistemically irrational or always based on false or misleading beliefs. Though this conclusion will be surprising to some readers, I argue that it should not be: legal theorists and jurists have long argued that illegal—and morally wrongful—discrimination can be epistemically rational and, also, in people’s self interest.

Relationship to philosophical literature on racism, sexism, and oppression. A common objection to psychological explanations of injustice is that they ignore the deepest causes of social injustice, which are institutional and structural in nature. As a feminist scholar, I am very sensitive to this objection, and I am keen to avoid the mistake it identifies. Therefore, while my book is focused on a psychological phenomenon, I always keep in mind the bigger social picture. Ann Cudd and José Medina are two of my exemplars. Both theorize oppression, yet they also analyze its epistemic and psychological underpinnings. (See Ann Cudd, *Analyzing Oppression*, OUP 2006 & José Medina, *The Epistemology of Resistance*, OUP 2013.) Throughout the book, I use real-life examples of oppression and institutional discrimination to spur more careful reflection about the ethical wrongs of stereotyping. My book’s seventh chapter is also entirely devoted to oppression-based theories of wrongful stereotyping.

My book is also engaged with theorists who have written on more specific topics related to stereotyping, including racism, racial profiling, and the epistemology of ignorance. (See, for example, Jorge Garcia, “The Heart of Racism,” 2006; Tommie Shelby, “Is Racism in the Heart?” 2002; Annabelle Lever, “What’s Wrong with Racial Profiling?” 2007; Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana, *Race & Epistemologies of Ignorance*, SUNY, 2007.) Theorists of these phenomena do not offer general theories of wrongful stereotyping or discrimination; their focus is narrower than that. Nonetheless, I deploy their work when relevant, connecting it to the project of examining the conditions under which stereotyping *in general* is wrong.

1d. Outline

The book features nine chapters, a short introduction, and conclusion. I expect it to be around 90,000 words in length.

Chapter 1. *A Starting Point for a Theory of Wrongful Stereotyping: What is a Stereotype? What is Stereotyping?*

Chapter 1 searches for a starting point for a theory of when and why stereotyping is wrong. I begin by advancing a set of criteria—which I borrow from Elizabeth Barnes—for selecting a conception of stereotyping that can serve as a reliable starting point for a theory of wrongful stereotyping. Then I offer a brief discussion of the historical origins of the terms “stereotype” and “stereotyping.” Afterwards, I map the contested conceptual space associated with these terms. Applying Barnes’ criteria to competing conceptions, two rivals emerge. Option 1: *to stereotype is to judge persons by group membership*. Option 2: *to stereotype is to wrongly judge persons by group membership*. Either one, I argue, satisfies her criteria equally well. Likewise, both conceptions are useful for exploring the philosophical puzzles associated with stereotyping. So either conception works equally well for the

purposes of this book. As I explain, my preferred view is that to stereotype is to judge persons by real or apparent group membership.

Chapter 2. *Stereotyping and Discrimination: Their Relationship and Why it Matters*

This chapter examines the relationship between stereotyping and discrimination, as well as its methodological significance for theorists interested in both phenomena. I begin by distinguishing two claims. The first claim—which I call *the causal claim*—is that stereotyping and discrimination stand in the relationship of cause and effect: stereotyping causes discrimination and, discrimination in turn causes stereotyping. The second claim—which I call *the constitutive claim*—is that stereotyping is itself a kind of discrimination, specifically, cognitive discrimination. If the constitutive claim were correct, stereotyping someone would be a way of discriminating against that person, even if one’s thoughts did not cause one to behave in a discriminatory way. Though theorists typically endorse the causal claim, I argue that they should be open to the constitutive claim as well. To render the constitutive claim more plausible, I defend it against five salient objections. I also point out that the constitutive claim reveals a novel—and highly promising—methodological possibility. That is, once we recognize that stereotyping is a form of discrimination, we make it possible for the best theory of when and why discrimination is wrong to also explain what’s wrong with stereotyping.

Chapter 3. *Desiderata for a Theory of Wrongful Stereotyping*

This chapter is devoted to clarifying—and justifying—the criteria for evaluating possible theories, which I will use in chapter 4 - 9. I argue that any successful theory of wrongful stereotyping must satisfy two desiderata: *the identification condition* and *the explanatory condition*. According to the identification condition, a successful theory must be able to identify paradigmatic cases of wrongful stereotyping as such. According to the explanatory condition, a successful theory must be able to adequately explain why wrongful cases of stereotyping are that way. After interpreting these desiderata and navigating several controversies surrounding them, I apply them to a toy theory in order to demonstrate how they function.

Chapter 4. *Failing to Treat Persons as Individuals*

If someone says, “You’ve stereotyped me,” we hear the statement as an accusation. One way to interpret the accusation is as follows: you haven’t seen or treated me as an individual. In this chapter, I interpret and evaluate a theory of wrongful stereotyping inspired by this thought, what I call *the failure to treat persons as individuals theory of wrongful stereotyping*. According to this theory, stereotyping is wrong if and only if it involves failing to treat persons as individuals. I argue that the theory—however one interprets it—fails.

Chapter 5. *Prejudice*

Stereotyping and prejudice have a deep connection, but the nature of their connection is not well understood. Are stereotypes and prejudices the same thing? Are only some stereotypes prejudices?

Are stereotypes and prejudices entirely different things? In this chapter, I explore different conceptions of prejudice in psychology and philosophy. I also test what I call *the prejudice-focused theory of wrongful stereotyping*. This theory says that stereotyping is wrong when, and because, it is motivated by morally bad prejudice. Deploying an analogy with statistical discrimination, I argue that not all stereotyping—and not even every case of wrongful stereotyping—is motivated by morally bad prejudice. In closing, I demonstrate how this conclusion challenges some of Miranda Fricker’s key claims about epistemic injustice.

Chapter 6. Harm

In this chapter, I examine the relationship between stereotyping and harm. I argue that judging people primarily by their real or apparent group membership, i.e., stereotyping is not necessarily harmful in a short-term or long-term sense. However morally bad stereotyping often does cause harm, either directly or indirectly. Because of this, one might be tempted to defend a *harm-focused theory of wrongful stereotyping*. According to such a theory, stereotyping is wrong if and only if it sufficiently harms others. I explore an immediate challenge to harm-based theories: people who stereotype others in offensive and even cruel ways don’t necessarily communicate that they have done so. When stereotyping happens exclusively in thought, no one appears to be harmed. I explore different ways in which advocates of harm-based theories of wrongful stereotyping can argue that stereotyping is harmful in such cases, despite appearances otherwise. Even if we are persuaded by these responses, I argue that bigger problems—about explanatory adequacy—exist for harm-based theories of wrongful stereotyping.

Chapter 7. Oppression

In this chapter, I examine the relationship between stereotyping and oppression. Exploring different ways in which stereotyping reflects and entrenches oppressive social conditions through the work of theorists such as Kristie Dotson, José Medina, and Iris Marion Young, I motivate an oppression-focused theory of wrongful stereotyping. According to such a theory, stereotyping is wrong if and only if it reflects or entrenches oppressive social conditions. Then I present two objections to such a theory, namely, that it cannot explain what’s wrong with cases of idiosyncratic but unjust stereotyping, as well as cases in which stereotyping reflects emerging (but not yet entrenched) group oppression. These objections, I argue, challenge the theory’s criterion for wrongful stereotyping by revealing its unreliability in some cases.

Chapter 8. Disrespect

Is wrongful stereotyping always disrespectful? In this chapter, I identify three conceptions of disrespect: a mental state conception, an expressive conception, and a deliberative conception. Using respect-focused theories of wrongful discrimination as a springboard, I argue that the deliberative conception of disrespect has the best chances of serving as the basis for a plausible *respect-focused theory of wrongful stereotyping*. Such a theory would say that stereotyping is wrong if and only if it constitutes or causes deliberative failure. Spelling out the details of this theory, I argue

that it has the potential to identify almost all cases of wrongful stereotyping as such. However, it also has a serious problem: the theory suggests that respect is explanatorily superfluous.

Chapter 9. *A New Disjunctive Theory of Wrongful Stereotyping.*

In the book's final chapter, I argue for a new disjunctive theory of wrongful stereotyping. According to this theory, there will be *wrongs* of stereotyping, but no single *wrong* of stereotyping. I explore different forms that such a theory could take, examining existing theories of wrongful discrimination advanced by Larry Alexander, Richard Arneson, Benjamin Eidelson, and Thomas Scanlon. My own preferred theory emerges as I reflect on Thomas Scanlon's contractualist ethical theory. According to Scanlon, wrongful actions are unjustifiable to others; however, unjustifiable actions are that way for a range of reasons. The best theory of wrongful stereotyping, if we adopt this picture, would consist in an account of the typical grounds on which someone can reasonably reject being stereotyped.

1e. Audience

What's Wrong with Stereotyping? could be used in lower or upper division philosophy courses in ethics, political theory, feminist philosophy, or the philosophy of race. Since the book breaks new ground, it can also be taught in graduate seminars and will become an essential text in the philosophy of stereotyping.

My book has the potential to reach a wider academic audience as well. Lawyers and legal theorists will find the project engaging. It raises questions about the relationship between stereotyping and discrimination, and it asks how existing theories of wrongful discrimination can be used to explain what's wrong with stereotyping. Its interdisciplinary nature and case-based style make it accessible to educational theorists, social and cognitive psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists.

The questions with which the book wrestles are, moreover, on the forefront of the public mind in places such as the United States. Books like Kahneman's *Thinking Fast and Slow* and Banaji and Greenwald's *Blindspot*—books about bias and stereotyping—have been best sellers. My book uses philosophical tools—including the tools of applied ethics—to think more systematically about the ethical and political aspects of stereotyping and bias. Anyone interested in these aspects of bias is a potential reader.

1f. Market Comparisons

There are no direct competitors to my book on the market. However, there are many books with affinities to mine.

Mahzarin Banaji & Anthony Greenwald, **Blindspot: The Hidden Biases of Good People**

Banaji and Greenwald's book is a popular introduction to psychological research on implicit bias. My book is different from theirs in two ways. First, I am interested in both implicit *and* explicit stereotyping, not just implicit stereotyping. Second, my book is

philosophical in nature. I offer an ethical analysis of what's wrong with stereotyping, whereas Banaji and Greenwald do not.

Michael Brownstein and Jennifer Saul, **Implicit Bias and Philosophy: Volumes 1 & 2**

Brownstein and Saul's collection of articles is an invaluable resource, but its content is quite different from my book. No author in the collection pursues a theory of when and why stereotyping in general is wrong. No one even pursues a general theory of when and why implicitly biased judgments are wrong. The majority of ethical articles in the two volumes are about moral responsibility. My book sets aside questions of responsibility and asks a more basic question, that is, when and why is it wrong to stereotype?

Matt Drabek, **Classify & Label: The Unintended Marginalization of Social Groups**

Drabek's book is an examination of classification and labeling practices, especially in the human sciences and psychiatry. It is structured around three case studies: feedback bias in the human sciences, BDSM and gender identity, and pornography and gender.

My book differs from Drabek's in three ways. First, as a theorist, my focus is stereotyping, not categorization. (The two are related but not identical.) Second, my book is structured around specific ethical objections to stereotyping, e.g., that it is harmful, fails to treat persons as individuals, etc. Both its structure and its wider range of examples from everyday life make the book accessible to a wider audience. Finally, Drabek defends a specific kind of oppression-based theory of wrongful classification, according to which ethically problematic classifications marginalize social groups. I defend a disjunctive theory of wrongful stereotyping. So our positive views are different.

Miranda Fricker, **Epistemic Injustice: The Power and Ethics of Knowing**

Fricker's influential book is devoted to epistemic injustices and, in particular, to two forms of it: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Both phenomena have a relationship to stereotyping. She offers an account of what's wrong with testimonial injustice—a phenomenon caused by stereotyping—which I discuss in my book's fifth chapter. On Fricker's view, morally bad prejudice causes testimonial injustice and explains why it is wrong. She also gives several other competing explanations of what's wrong with testimonial injustice (e.g., that it is disrespectful to persons as knowers and, hence as rational agents).

My book has a more general focus than Fricker's in that I am interested in stereotyping per se and not only cases of stereotyping that cause unjust credibility deficits or hermeneutical injustice. However, I test the extent to which her theory of what's ethically wrong with testimonial injustice could explain what's wrong with stereotyping more generally. I argue that a prejudice-based theory like hers cannot function as a theory of when and why stereotyping *in general* is wrong and, moreover, that it does not even work for testimonial injustice because not all instances of testimonial injustice are motivated by

morally bad prejudice. My book also eschews a virtue-theoretic framework, which Fricker embraces.

Sally Haslanger, **Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique**

Haslanger's book consists in a series of essays about social construction, social categories, ideology, and oppression. In *What's Wrong with Stereotyping?* I deploy Haslanger's work (especially on ideology and essentialism) while also challenging aspects of it. Still our books are not really competitors. Mine searches for a theory of when and why stereotyping is ethically wrong. Hers analyzes how social oppression functions. I see these as complementary enterprises.

Daniel Kahneman, **Thinking Fast & Slow**

Kahneman is a psychologist; I am a philosopher. Whereas he offers a discussion of heuristics and biases related to stereotyping, my book is focused on explaining what is ethically wrong with stereotyping.

José Medina: **The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistance Imaginations**

In this book, Medina offers a powerful analysis of the epistemic dimensions of oppression and resistance, mostly from a virtue-theoretic perspective. On his view, oppression encourages epistemic vices, especially in members of dominant groups (including active ignorance, insensitivity, and overconfidence), while it fosters epistemic virtues in individuals from oppressed groups (including creativity, open-mindedness, and lucidity).

My book differs from Medina's in a number of ways. First, I do not use a virtue theoretic framework to understand what's wrong with stereotyping. I do, however, connect Medina's discussion of oppression-related virtues and vices to various theories of what's wrong with stereotyping, including harm-based and oppression-based theories of wrongful stereotyping. Second, while Medina is primarily focused on the knowledge-related dimensions of oppression and resistance, I am focused on ethics. I take our projects to be complementary, but different.

1g. Time Frame & Status of Book

I plan to complete this manuscript by August 2019. Four of its nine chapters are finished. See writing sample.

1. "A Starting Point for a Theory of Stereotyping: What is a Stereotype? What is Stereotyping?" Draft completed.
2. "Stereotyping and Discrimination: Their Relationship and Why It Matters" Draft Completed.
3. "Desiderata for a Theory of Wrongful Stereotyping" Draft Completed.

4. "Failing to Treat Persons as Individuals" Draft Completed.
5. "Prejudice" Draft expected spring 2018
6. "Harm" Draft expected summer 2018
7. "Oppression" Draft expected summer 2018
8. "Disrespect" Draft expected fall 2018
9. "A New Disjunctive Theory of Wrongful Stereotyping" Draft expected spring 2019
10. "Introduction" & "Conclusion" Draft expected summer 2019

1h. About the Author

Erin Beeghly is an assistant professor at the University of Utah. She is the Phillip L. Quinn Fellow at the National Humanities Center during the 2016-2017 academic year. Her work has also been supported by the American Association for University Women and the Townsend Center for the Humanities at Berkeley. She was trained at Oxford University, where she received a BA in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, as well as at UC Berkeley, where she received a BA in History and a PhD in Philosophy. She teaches courses on equality and discrimination in the workplace, ethical theories, the philosophy of implicit bias, and philosophy in literature. Her publications include articles about wrongful discrimination and about how to conceptualize stereotypes and stereotyping for the purposes of normative inquiry.

During 2016-17, Professor Beeghly is also organizing a series of interdisciplinary conferences around the topic of "bias in context" with Professor Jules Holroyd at the University of Sheffield and Alex Madva at California Polytechnic, Pomona. The final conference in the series will be held at the University of Utah in October 2017.