This book investigates the ethical puzzles associated with stereotyping from a philosophical perspective. How, I ask, should we conceptualize stereotypes and stereotyping? Should we think that stereotyping is always wrong? Should we think, instead, that stereotyping could never be wrong because of its cognitive and practical indispensability? If stereotyping is sometimes but not always wrong, how do we tell the bad cases from the rest? Using historical case studies and current events, I argue for a pluralistic account of what's wrong with stereotyping nestled within a contractualist ethical framework.
Project funded by the National Humanities Center, the American Council for Learned Societies, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. |
AN INTRODUCTION TO IMPLICIT BIAS: KNOWLEDGE, JUSTICE, AND THE SOCIAL MIND. Routledge, 2020. Edited with Alex Madva.
This edited volume aims to engage undergraduates, who may have little or no training in philosophy, as well as experts on bias. It is the first philosophical introduction on the topic of implicit bias. Read about the book at the Pea Soup ethics blog (here and here), the Brains blog (here), and Imperfect Cognitions (here). Available now!
Contributors include Saray Ayala-López, Rima Basu, Erin Beeghly, Michael Brownstein, Lacey Davidson, Noel Dominguez, Nathifa Greene, Jules Holroyd, Gabbrielle Johnson, Céline Leboeuf, Alex Madva, Nancy McHugh, Katherine Puddifoot, and Susanna Siegel. |